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Libel and slander are branches of the law of defamation. Defama­tion law authorizes remedies 
for reputational harm caused by 
some false statements of fact. A libel 
is a defamatory statement that is 
printed or written; a slander is a 
defamatory statement that is spo­
ken. 
During the 2016 presidential cam­
paign, candidate Donald Trump sug­
gested that, ifelected, he would 
"open up our libel laws" to facilitate 
lawsuits by public officials against 
news organizations. 
A few weeks ago, President 
Trump concluded a tweet critical of 
the New York Times with the rhetori­
cal question: "Change libel laws?" 
And last weekend, White House 
Chief of Staff Reince Priebus stated 
that the administration has looked 
into modifying the law of libel. 
So what power does the Constitu­
tion give the president to "open up" 
the libel laws? In truth, almost none. 
For starters, libel and slander are 
state law causes of action. There are 
no federal statutes that generally 
regulate libel or slander. And the 
Supreme Court has ruled that the 
Constitution does not pretect harm 
to one's reputation. 
Obviously, the president has no 
power to alter state law. And just as 
obviously, he has no power to enact 
federal law on his own. 
Sometimes, the president may use 
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his law enforcement discre­
tion t.o change the ways in 
which federal laws are ad­
ministered. Consider, for ex­
ample, President Trump's re­
cent executive orders man­
dating stricter enforcement 
of federal immigration 
statutes. 
But, again, there is no fed­
eral law of libel or slander for 
the president t.o enforce more 
or less strictly. 
So what then is the presi­
dent considering? 
One path forward could be 
for the president to ask 
Congress to enact a federal 
libel law that is more to his 
liking than the laws presently 
on the books in the states. 
But such a request would al­
most certainly fail. 
First, many in Congress 
would surely view such a pro­
posal as an unwarranted at­
tack on our free press. A free 
press has long been consid­
ered a linchpin of democracy 
and necessary for trans­
parency in government. Ex­
posing the press to libel suits 
could deter it from perform­
ing its essential functions. 
Second, many in Congress 
would surely conclude that, 
even if the Constitution were 
t.o permit the federalization of 
the law of libel (a doubtful 
proposition), actually doing 
so would constitute an inap­
propriate federal intrusion 
into a regulatory area prop­
erly reserved to the states. 
But let's suppose, purely 
for the sake of argument, that 
the president could persuade 
Congress to enact legislation 
making it easier for public of­
ficials to sue the press, and 
that such legislation could 
plausibly be grounded in a 
power the Constitution gives 
to Congress. Even so, any 
such legislation would violate 
the free speech and free 
press guarantees of the First 
Amendment. 
Under current law, the 
states are not free to fashion 
the law of libel and slander as 
they see fit. Rather, because 
libel and slander actions seek 
monetary damage awards 
that punish defamatory 
speech, the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the First 
Amendment to place a num­
ber of limits on how states 
can define them. 
One such limit makes it 
exceedingly difficult for 
elected officials - and, indeed, 
public figures generally - to 
prevail in a libel or slander 
action: the legal rule formu­
lated in the Supreme Court's 
landmark 1964 decision in 
New York Times v. Sullivan. 
New York Times v. Sulli­
van arose out of a libel action 
brought against the paper 
and four African American 
clergymen who authored a 
full-page advertisement, ti­
tled "Heed Their Rising 
Voices," that ran on March 
29, 1960. The advertisement 
described aspects of the vio­
lent Southern resistance to 
the civil rights movement and 
solicited funds for the de­
fense of Martin Luther King, 
Jr., who had been indicted for 
perjury, 
The plaintiff, a commis­
sioner of the city of Mont­
gomery, Ala., with responsi­
bility for public safety, com­
plained that a number of rela­
tively minor factual inaccura­
cies about the Montgomery 
police force contained in the 
advertisement had caused 
him reputational harm. An 
Alabama jury agreed and 
awarded him $500,000. The 
Alabama Supreme Court af­
firmed But the United States 
Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Justice William Brennan, 
reversed. 
Taking note of our "pro­
found national commitment 
to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide­
open, and that it may well in­
clude vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government 
and public officials," the 
court held that the First 
Amendment bars a public of­
ficial from establishing libel 
unless he proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that the 
defendant published a false 
statement about him with 
"actual malice" - that is, with 
knowledge of its falsity or a 
reckless disregard of the 
truth. 
In practice, this standard 
is nearly impossible to satisfy. 
So is there anything else 
the president could do to 
"open up" our libel laws? 
The Supreme Court has 
not shown an interest in re­
treating from New York 
Times v. Sullivan, so only 
one option remains: to seek a 
constitutional amendment 
overturning the case's actual­
malice standard. Unless we 
were to call a second consti­
tutional convention, such an 
amendment would require 
approval by two-thirds of 
each house of Congress, and 
then three-fourths (37) of the 
states. This simply is not go­
ing to happen. The bottom 
line is this: The Constitution 
does not allow the president 
to open up the libel laws. 
(John Greahe teaches con­
stitutional law and related 
subjects at the University af 
New Hampshire School of 
Law. He also serves on the 
board oftrustees ofthe New 
Hampshire Institute for 
Civics Education. ) 
